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For many years, the use of mercury in Artisanal and Small-scale Gold Mining has afforded an income for
many persons without better options, but has brought with it extensive harm to the environment, the
miners and their communities. Technical and ﬁnancial assistance have focused on raising awareness of
the affected mining communities and encouraging the transition to mercury-free techniques. However,
relatively little research has examined the roles of the stakeholders in the mercury supply chain, and
their ability to inﬂuence the mercury-free transition. This paper analyzes the stakeholders and their
diverse roles with regard to the trade and supply of mercury for Artisanal and Small-scale Gold Mining.
The paper applies a supply chain management approach to stakeholder theory. This is done through an
extensive literature review, a qualitative content analysis, an online survey and the development of
supply chain diagrams that were validated by experts in the ﬁeld. By providing a comprehensive picture
of the stakeholders and their roles, this paper helps governments, inter- and non-governmental orga-
nizations and others to better understand stakeholders and their interactions with the mercury supply
chain at multiple levels, permitting the development of appropriate policies within the context of the
Minamata Convention on Mercury, and the preparation of better adapted National Action Plans.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In recent years increased attention has been devoted to the
environment and health issues related to mercury (Hg) uses and
releases worldwide (UNEP, 2008a, 2008b). Mercury is a natural
element used in a great variety of applications such as dental
amalgam, chlor-alkali production, thermostats and gold amalga-
mation (UNEP, 2013a, 2013b). It is also unintentionally emitted via
industrial activities like coal combustion, cement production and
metal smelting (UNEP, 2013b). Due to its high toxicity and hazard to
human health and the environment, mercury has increasingly been
regulated worldwide in order to reduce its trade, use and releases.
Today, the largest anthropogenic source of mercury emissions is
Artisanal and Small-scale Gold Mining (ASGM). ASGM is a sub-sector
of Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (ASM) and is deﬁned as: “[…]
gold mining conducted by individual miners or small enterprises with
limited capital investment and production”.1 ASGM may be formal or
informal and may be carried out by family groups, partnerships, co-Ltd. This is an open access article u
.C. Fritz),operatives or associations, including men, women, seasonal workers
and not infrequently, children (e.g., Basu et al., 2015; Ali, 2009; Phi-
lippine Government, 2011). ASGM workers typically use simple or
rudimentary methods to explore, extract, process and transport mi-
nerals (WGC, 2015; OECD, 2012). Mercury is often used in this process
because it readily amalgamates with gold particles present in the ore.
However, the basic processing techniques generally employed lead to
substantial emissions of mercury to the atmosphere and releases to
waterways and the soil. ASGM attracts many people who have limited
alternative employment opportunities, and many others who ﬁnd it
more proﬁtable than work in agriculture, which is often the only
option (Nyame and Blocher, 2010; Bryceson and Jønsson, 2010). It is
estimated that up to 15 million people work in this sector in about 70
countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa. The most recent estimates
of the Artisanal Gold Council puts ASGM annual gold production in
the range of 400 metric tons, or nearly 15 percent of worldwide
primary mine production.2 Larger mining operations employ pro-
cesses that do not involve mercury.
To encourage the ASGM transition to mercury-free techniques,
empirical research shows that inter-governmental organizationsnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
2 400 metric tons (Telmer, 2015); 25% (Cordy et al., 2013; Saldarriaga-Isaza
et al., 2013; Chouinard and Veiga, 2008); 20% (The World Bank, 2013); 12–15%
(Ismawati, 2014); 20–30% (UNEP, 2008b).
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mining associations and some local governments have provided a
range of assistance to miners and their communities, with greater
or lesser success, depending on the project. However, little non-
empirical research has been conducted in the ﬁeld, which is “the
ﬁrst necessary step for the design of policies […] to regulate both
extraction and pollution”, especially mercury pollution (Sal-
darriaga-Isaza et al., 2013). Much of the research literature makes
reference to ASGM stakeholders, but this information has not yet
been analyzed and presented in a single paper. This paper's qua-
litative analysis of the stakeholders associated with the trade and
supply of mercury for use in ASGM, and their various roles, is a
critical ﬁrst step in developing appropriate programs (García et al.,
2015, p. 252) and better understanding the sector, particularly in
the context of the Minamata Convention on Mercury, which has an
article speciﬁcally dealing with ASGM.3
The main research question addressed is: How can mercury
supply chain stakeholders contribute to the transition of the ASGM
community to mercury-free techniques? This implies other related
questions, namely: Who are the stakeholders of the mercury
supply chain? What are their direct and indirect roles? And at
what level (local, regional, national, international) does each sta-
keholder interact with the supply chain? To answer these ques-
tions, this paper takes a supply chain (SC) perspective, which
means that the producers, traders and users taking part in the
mercury trade and supply (MT&S) system are all held up to scru-
tiny. Identifying and engaging SC stakeholders not only facilitates
the overall sustainability of global SCs (e.g., Li et al., 2014; Müller
et al., 2009), but also contributes to some of the Sustainable De-
velopment Goals (e.g., goal 17: strengthen the means of im-
plementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable
development). The methodology for identifying stakeholders and
assessing their roles for this paper comprised an exhaustive lit-
erature review, a qualitative content analysis, an online survey of
experts in the ﬁeld and the development of SC diagrams whose
ﬁndings were subsequently validated by experts.
There are certain limitations to this approach that must be noted.
The authors themselves did not carry out ﬁeld research for this paper,
so the paper does not present, for example, a speciﬁc case study
naming individual stakeholders, explaining their precise roles and
detailing how they are organized in a given mining area. Not sur-
prisingly, each mining area has its own unique relationship with the
various stakeholders. On the other hand, the extensive input from
experts – several of whom have spent decades in ASGM ﬁeldwork –
helped to insure against any oversights and/or any misinterpretation
of research ﬁndings by the authors. Therefore, despite the lack of ﬁeld
work carried out speciﬁcally for this paper, the authors are conﬁdent
of its potential contribution to mercury-free ASGM practices.
In the following text, ﬁrst, the authors present the basic theory
from the stakeholder and SC management ﬁelds on which the ana-
lysis is based. Second, the methodology is described in more detail.
Third, stakeholders from both the ASGM community and the mer-
cury SC are identiﬁed with regard to their direct and indirect roles in
the MT&S. Finally, the ﬁndings and recommendations are discussed,
conclusions are drawn and further research needs are outlined.2. Research background
2.1. Stakeholder identiﬁcation and supply chains
Stakeholder analysis is often used to better understand stake-
holders from an organizational perspective. In order for an3 Art. 7 and Annex C, Minamata Convention, (UNEP, 2013a).organization to develop appropriate policies and strategies with
regard to its stakeholders, the interests of all legitimate stake-
holders ﬁrst have to be known (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). It is
common to ﬁnd analyses based on a set of predeﬁned stakeholder
categories and interests, such as Mitchell et al. (1997) have pro-
posed. According to Friedman and Miles (2002), however, such
classiﬁcations do not enable one to appreciate the speciﬁcities of
an organization's environment. Additionally, as highlighted by
Simmons and Lovegrove (2005) in reference to the work of Froo-
man (1999) and other researchers in the ﬁeld, stakeholders’ per-
ceptions may change over time, and the interests of stakeholders
in the organization may vary considerably (Savage et al., 2004).
Günther and Hüske (2015) have asserted that Stakeholder Theory
is particularly relevant nowadays to improving the understanding
of complex environments where sustainability (in terms of en-
vironment, economy, society and ethics) is at stake. This includes
the identiﬁcation of stakeholders and their impacts (threats or
beneﬁts) on the organization.
When considering global sustainability issues and supply
chains, taking a holistic perspective is seen as a challenging but
fruitful way “to capture the multifaceted reality of [Sustainable
Supply Chain Management] SSCM” (Touboulic and Walker, 2015).
This suggests that when organizations have to face complex and
challenging problems in large networks such as SCs, a holistic
approach may help to engage and balance the different and
sometimes contradictory stakeholder needs (Roloff, 2008). This
approach is similar to “supply chain governance” (deﬁned here as
the engagement of internal and external stakeholders), which
supports sustainability in global SCs, as mentioned previously (e.g.
Li et al., 2014; Müller et al., 2009).
Among sustainability issues in SCs, chemicals and hazardous
substances are of high priority. For example, to adequately manage
chemicals in products and SCs, UNEP (2014) recommends that
companies be “active” rather than “passive.” Many downstream
companies tend to follow a “passive strategy” of limiting their ef-
forts and investments to simple compliance with regulations, and
are hence unprepared for a potential chemical related crisis, which
may put their reputation and ﬁnancial viability at risk. An active
strategy implies investing in “due-diligence chemicals manage-
ment” (e.g., speciﬁc purchasing criteria, product design and/or
supplier involvement) to better understand the chemicals in pro-
ducts and SCs, and to be prepared for shifts in demand and
changes in regulations, thereby creating “long-term value for
themselves, their shareholders, the public, and the planet” (UNEP,
2014). This is all the more necessary since the demand for trans-
parency in products and SCs is growing (Meyer and Kirby, 2010). In
this respect, Gold (2011) considers stakeholder management as an
“extension of supply chain management” since it takes account of a
multitude of stakeholders that are external to the SC but none-
theless have an impact on the SC, or may be impacted by the
decisions taken within the SC.
Reed et al. (2009) contended that the stakeholder identiﬁcation
process has not received enough attention, especially as the rest of
the stakeholder analysis relies on this ﬁrst step. These authors
reviewed the relevant literature and highlighted the importance of
using an iterative process in the identiﬁcation of stakeholders in
order to avoid, among other things, the bias inherent in a top-
down approach. They also recommended the use of special
methods, in line with the research carried out by Chevalier and
Buckles (2008, pp.165–177), to categorize and classify stakeholders
“according to the degree they can affect or be affected by a pro-
blem or action”. Reed et al. (2009) also proposed criteria (e.g.,
geography, demographics) that may be used to differentiate and
group stakeholders, especially in cases where the list of stake-
holders may be long and complex. According to Gardner and
Cooper (2003), visual graphics may also be particularly useful to
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globalization of supply and delivery systems, while Bourne and
Walker (2006) and Salado and Nilchiani (2013) recommended the
same for stakeholder analysis. All of these are further addressed in
this paper.
2.2. Stakeholder identiﬁcation in the supply and trade of mercury for
use in ASGM
The Minamata Convention on Mercury requires Parties that
have determined that ASGM is “more than insigniﬁcant” in their
territory to develop and implement a national action plan (NAP)
that includes measures to reduce mercury exposure in ASGM.4
Gibb and O’Leary (2014) have pointed out that health effects due
to mercury exposure are an issue in this sector, but they should
be taken into consideration within a wider range of sustainability
issues such as the poverty-driven characteristics of ASGM. This
observation implies also a wider range of stakeholders. Spiegel
et al. (2014) added to this discussion by highlighting the lack of
involvement of ASGM communities in developing mercury po-
licies. Ali (2006) went beyond local ASGM issues and highlighted
the need for a “shared responsibility of gold consumption pat-
terns.” Both developed and developing countries, as well as
governments and companies all need to be involved in tackling
environmental, social and economic issues in the sector. There is
hence a need to look at the “entire life cycle of the metal and the
shared responsibility” of mercury “producers, processors and
consumers” (Ali, 2006). Ali (2006) furthermore illustrated and
quantiﬁed the reserves of gold that were held by private in-
vestors, fabricators, banks and institutions, and contained in
jewelry and geological reserves. His paper therefore identiﬁed
additional stakeholders implicated in the gold SC such as end-
consumers, recyclers, ﬁnancing institutions and jewelers, but it
did not link the gold SC with the mercury SC, nor did it distin-
guish between gold coming from Large Scale Mining operations
and gold produced by ASGM. Nor did it make the link with the
broader operating environment that includes Inter-Govern-
mental Organizations (IGOs), governments, global trade organi-
zations, etc.
The ﬁrst focus on a SC associated with the ASGM process is
found in Sippl and Selin (2012), where they discussed the gold SC.
But they did not explore the mercury SC and they did not discuss
the different ways that mercury and gold may be traded (e.g. legal,
illegal and extra-legal). They concentrated on the role of the ﬁnal
consumer, whose choice among gold-containing products may be
inﬂuenced by the use of a fair-trade label, as also observed by Ali
(2006). The fair-trade label is intended to encourage a more
“ethical” consumption, although its deﬁnition is the subject of
some debate (Sippl and Selin, 2012). Sippl and Selin emphasized
that technology transfer and the adaptation of mercury-free gold
mining techniques to the local context are the core issue. While
not denying that importance, this paper contends that the scope
for helping ASGM to become mercury-free should be much
broader than that, and needs to include multiple levels of stake-
holders and multiple SCs.5 1 Programme Ofﬁcer (PO) working on atmospheric mercury emissions from
anthropogenic sources, 1 PO working on the Global Mercury Partnership and re-
duction of intentional mercury uses, 1 PO working on mercury use in ASGM,
1 Project Ofﬁcer working on chemicals use in supply chains, 1 consultant working3. Methods
Starting with a qualitative approach, this paper builds on that
foundation using primary and secondary data to gain an in-depth
understanding of the stakeholders involved in MT&S for use in
ASGM, and their roles. The following methods have been used to4 Art. 7 and Annex C, Minamata Convention (UNEP, 2013a) and UNEP (2015).identify and validate the stakeholders associated with this sector.
3.1. Participant observation
“Participant observation” is a methodology often used in qua-
litative research that refers to a close and extended relationship
with a given group or team that permits special insights into their
working environment, knowledge and practices. It is an approach
that may be used for a variety of purposes (Murphy et al., 1998). In
this case it took the form of a 4-month research position at the
Chemicals and Wastes Branch of the Division of Technology, In-
dustry and Economics (DTIE) of the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP) in Geneva, between April and August 2014. The
objective was to provide the ﬁrst author/researcher with an in-
depth understanding of MT&S for use in ASGM from a holistic
perspective (i.e., at the local, regional, national and international
level). UNEP was for this purpose an ideal organization since it
often acts as intermediary between governments and on-site
activities.
Consistent with the guidance of Becker and Geer (1960), the
research topic was initially broadly deﬁned as mercury trade for
use in ASGM. A broad deﬁnition avoids any premature identiﬁca-
tion of the research gap, and provides an objective and systematic
means of identifying the issues that are most worth studying
(Becker and Geer, 1960). The research was gradually narrowed to
the identiﬁcation of stakeholders in MT&S for use in ASGM, and
the data collection was increasingly focused as described by
Murphy et al. (1998), similar to the “funnel shape” in Hammersley
and Atkinson (1995). As suggested in the literature (Denzin, 1970;
Foster, 1993; Bryman, 1988), the ﬁrst author participated in the
daily activities of UNEP and came to see the issue from an “insider”
UNEP perspective. In this manner, the ﬁrst author gained not only
an in-depth familiarity with the issue but also access to informa-
tion not available to “outsiders” such as an unrestricted access to
the Comtrade database; contacts for the online survey with gov-
ernment ofﬁcials, IGOs, NGOs and experts in the ﬁeld; and access
to non-scientiﬁc peer reviewed literature (e.g., United Nations
reports), guidelines, standards and valuable databases on MT&S.
Above all, the ﬁrst author was able to engage with UNEP experts5
on the ﬁndings of the stakeholder identiﬁcation process in an
iterative manner, and beneﬁt from their vast knowledge and ex-
perience (e.g. mercury waste, mercury amalgamation, mercury
recycling) by adopting the role of “learner” (Fielding, 1993). As
emphasized by Denzin (1970), the researcher typically uses a
range of pragmatic data collection methods. In this case they in-
cluded the online survey of Government ofﬁcials, IGOs, NGOs and
researchers; formal and informal interviews with UNEP experts;
the use of the UN Comtrade database6 to analyze global mercury
trade; and a systematic literature review and qualitative content
analysis. Of those diverse research methods, the ones that pro-
vided information of use to this paper (the literature review,
content analysis, online survey and questionnaire to experts) are
further discussed below.
3.2. Systematic literature review
In order to collect the supporting information for the devel-
opment of SC diagrams and their subsequent validation by experts,on mercury stocks, 1 consultant working on mercury use in ASGM, 2 PO working on
the mercury negotiations and Minamata Convention.
6 United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, http://comtrade.un.org/.
Fig. 1. Number of reference documents per year (N¼156).
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suggested by Fink (2005). A search was carried out using the fol-
lowing keywords: “Artisanal and Small-scale Gold Mining”, “Arti-
sanal and Small-scale Gold Mining” AND “mercury”, “mercury
trade”, “mercury” AND “gold-mining”, “trade control”, “illegal trade”
AND “mercury”, “mercury” AND “supply chain” in the title, abstract
and keywords of the papers. The search targeted several online
databases: “Scopus”, “Web of Knowledge”, “JSTOR” and “Google
Scholars”. The time period included publications from 2006 to
2014 – 2006 being the publication date of the latest and most
complete report on global MT&S (UNEP, 2006a). Fig. 1 presents the
total search results, showing the number of documents per year of
publication, while Fig. 2 shows the same total in terms of the
different types of documents identiﬁed, and the number of
documents of each type.
The keyword search led initially to 77 English language scien-
tiﬁc peer-reviewed papers. No restriction was set regarding the
ﬁeld of research. This search was extended by a snowball sampling
as per Fink (2005) on the initial sample of 77 papers extracted. The
inclusion of additional scientiﬁc papers stopped when it did not
provide any new information on stakeholders and their roles,
consistent with the grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). In
total, 99 scientiﬁc papers were identiﬁed, as well as reports on
mercury and ASGM, guidance documents for reducing mercury
releases and training miners, documents on responsible SCs, reg-
ulations on mercury and gold standards, books on MT&S and
ASGM, and others (e.g., Masters and PhD theses, ASGM and mer-
cury country analyses provided by survey participants, ASGM ex-
pert presentations, ASGM expert working papers) (see Fig. 2). In
addition to the online searches, some of these additional docu-
ments were provided by UNEP experts or survey participants. The
full list of reference documents is provided in the supplementary
material.Fig. 2. Number and type of reference documents (N¼156).3.3. Content analysis
The peer-reviewed scientiﬁc papers and other sources were
analyzed as proposed in the qualitative content analysis method of
Mayring (2008), using the MaxQDA software. Since the approach
was explorative, the codes (i.e., stakeholders and their roles) were
not set prior to the analysis but derived inductively from the
analysis.
3.4. Online survey
An online survey was used to identify stakeholders with a
role in SC mechanisms and to develop recommendations to re-
duce and control the MT&S for use in ASGM. The online survey
was designed together with the UNEP Ofﬁcer and UNEP Con-
sultant supervising the ﬁrst author. It included closed and open
questions and covered ﬁve thematic areas: (1) questions related
to statistics of imported and exported mercury; (2) questions
about the ASGM sector (for countries with ASGM activities);
(3) legal questions (only for countries with ASGM activities);
(4) questions related to the Minamata Convention on Mercury
(for countries with ASGM activities, as well as some questions
for countries without ASGM activities); and (5) demographics.
The survey was distributed amongst representatives of govern-
ments, NGOs, IGOs working on the issues of ASGM and re-
searchers. These participants were identiﬁed from the list of
focal points of the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals
Management (SAICM) available online.7 Additionally, the survey
was sent to all of the participants who attended the 5th session
of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to prepare a
global legally binding instrument on mercury (INC 5, 2013). A list
of 1078 persons was compiled, of which the e-mail addresses for
180 were not available. Hence, the sample consisted of 883
persons, of whom 135 e-mails were returned to sender and 748
persons were contacted. Following a reminder, the survey
achieved a participation rate of 18% (131 responses out of 748
contacts). After a total survey period of four months in 2014, 44
of the 131 participants fully completed the survey, 5 partially
(answering only the compulsory questions) completed it, and 83
responses were not completed sufﬁciently to be usable. Hence
the outputs from the online survey are based on information
provided by 49 respondents, whose proﬁle may be found in the
supplementary material (Table S1).
The SAICM and INC7 lists included country representatives,
NGOs and IGOs working on ASGM, and other stakeholders from all
countries concerned with chemicals and mercury. Several stake-
holders who were not on those lists, such as some experienced
researchers and experts with extensive ﬁeld experience in mer-
cury and ASGM, were consulted separately (see Section 3.6
Questionnaire to mercury and ASGM experts).
3.5. Development of supply chain diagrams
The ﬁndings from the qualitative content analysis and the on-
line survey informed the development of SC diagrams with the
help of yEd, a diagramming program.8 These diagrams contributed
to the formal and informal exchanges with UNEP experts during
the participant observation and the questionnaire sent to ASGM
and mercury experts. The diagrams included the identiﬁed sta-
keholders (e.g., formal and informal traders, gold shops), their
various roles (e.g., supply, storage of mercury) and the possible7 http://www.saicm.org/index.php?option¼com_con
tent&view¼category&layout¼blog&id¼143&Itemid¼528 (accessed 14 May 2014).
8 yEd is free diagraming software from yWorks GmbH available at: http://
www.yworks.com/products/yed (accessed 29 May 2016).
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represented by arrows. No weighting was applied or included in
these diagrams since the aim was not to identify which stake-
holders are most relevant but simply who the stakeholders are.
The diagrams were updated in an iterative manner with the inputs
of the different experts consulted. Such an approach may be in-
tegrated with the so-called “stakeholder-issue inter relationship
diagram,” where deﬁning the relationships between the stake-
holders themselves, and the relationships between these stake-
holders and the issue under consideration, enables the identiﬁ-
cation of actual and potential areas of cooperation or conﬂict
through an understanding of the different interests of the stake-
holders (Bryson, 2004). The approach taken in this paper builds on
the stakeholder-issue inter relationship diagram (by considering
the issue of MT&S for use in ASGM), but starts at the product level,
i.e., mercury. This somewhat novel approach enables a more ob-
jective and comprehensive identiﬁcation of direct and indirect
stakeholders since it does not focus on the responsibility of a
speciﬁc stakeholder, but rather concentrates on the analysis of the
mercury supply chain.
3.6. Questionnaire sent to mercury and ASGM experts
In order to offset any bias induced by only validating results
with UNEP experts, external mercury and ASGM experts were
consulted to validate or amend the SC diagrams. A qualitative
questionnaire was designed, and the selected experts were asked
if they agreed with the ﬁndings or if any stakeholder or stake-
holder role had been omitted. The list of external experts was
prepared with Expert 9 and by identifying authors of the selected
reference documents who have several publications in the ﬁeld or
have other close dealings with ASGM (e.g., The Artisanal GoldFig. 3. Overview of local ASGM stakeholders (P: mercury provider; PM: policy-making; T
FS: ﬁnancial support; F: formalization; AR: awareness raising; L: lobbying; LM: land man
ﬁgure, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)Council, S&P Trading, Alliance for Responsible Mining). In total, 31
experts were identiﬁed. All were contacted initially to review the
SC diagrams, and 9 responded (see expert proﬁle in Table A1). The
SC diagrams were updated with the information provided. The
same 9 experts were asked to review the updated SC diagrams and
5 responded a second time. One (Expert 5) agreed to a one-on-one
interview which lasted about 2 h and provided further detailed
information.4. Findings
The content analysis identiﬁed several interrelated SCs (see
Fig. 6). This paper focuses on the local ASGM stakeholders, the
mercury SC stakeholders and the operating environment, since
these are the stakeholders most important to the Minamata
Convention on Mercury. The broader environment (e.g. technolo-
gical change, socio-cultural forces, global economic forces and
global political/legal forces) that should be considered in a stake-
holder analysis, according to Harrison and John (1998), is in-
tegrated in the speciﬁc roles of each stakeholder.
4.1. Local ASGM stakeholders
Local stakeholders affecting or being affected by MT&S for use
in ASGM may have one or more roles depending on the formal or
informal legal status of MT&S on the one hand, and the legal status
of the ASGM activity on the other hand.
As shown in Fig. 3, 13 different local stakeholders are re-
cognized, of which two may directly affect or be affected (orange
ellipses), four may directly or indirectly affect or be affected (gold
ellipses), and seven may indirectly affect or be affected (blue: training; R: mercury recovery/recycling; S: mercury storage; C: gold certiﬁcation;
agement) (source: the authors). (For interpretation of the references to color in this
11 Mining in which the principal material sought is mercury (Art. 2, Minamata
Convention).
12 “Any substance consisting of atoms of mercury and one or more atoms of
other chemical elements (e.g., mercury chloride, mercury oxide, mercury sulphate,
mercury nitrate and mercury sulphide) that can be separated into different com-
ponents only by chemical reactions” (Art. 2 and 3, Minamata Convention).
13 “A product or product component that contains mercury or a mercury
compound that was intentionally added” (Art. 2 Minamata Convention).
14 Parties must “identify individual stocks of mercury or mercury compounds
exceeding 50 metric tons, as well as sources of mercury supply generating stocks
exceeding 10 metric tons per year, that are located within its territory” (Art.3,
Minamata Convention).
15 Substances or objects consisting of mercury or mercury compounds; con-
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diagram results from the content analysis and questionnaire to
experts, and represents the stakeholders currently involved, al-
though these relationships are subject to change due to multiple
factors (e.g., timeframe, location of the activity, etc.). The com-
plexity of some of these roles and interactions for MT&S (details of
each stakeholder are provided in Table A2) is discussed below.
Miners are often identiﬁed as the main stakeholders and the
only ones responsible for mercury releases (Spiegel, 2009b).
However, as mentioned, other stakeholders are involved and may
have a direct or indirect inﬂuence on MT&S for use in ASGM. Local
stakeholders involved in mercury supply, mercury recovery/re-
cycling, mercury storage and policy-making may also have a direct
impact on MT&S for use in ASGM, whereas local stakeholders in-
volved in lobbying, awareness raising, land management, certiﬁ-
cation, training or ﬁnancial support may have an indirect impact.
Some local stakeholders may have both direct and indirect im-
pacts, such as governments, ASGM miners, and informal mercury
and informal gold market stakeholders.
These stakeholders have very complex interactions. The formal
supply of mercury to ASGM may take place only in countries
where ASGM activity is allowed, but several governments like
Brazil and Colombia have prohibited mercury use in ASGM (Telmer
and Veiga, 2009; Spiegel and Veiga, 2010; García et al., 2015).
Others like China have outlawed ASGM activities altogether (Zhao
et al., 2015) rather than formalizing the sector, which would per-
mit better transparency and control of MT&S to ASGM (Hruschka,
2011). Hence formal mercury supply to ASGM is very limited, so it
often takes informal paths that may start in sectors where mercury
is permitted, such as dentistry (Sousa and Veiga, 2009). In the
future, one may hope that dentistry will play a decreasing role in
MT&S since UNEP and the World Health Organization (WHO) are
encouraging the sector to phase down mercury use (UNEP and
WHO, 2014), and the Minamata Convention also includes mea-
sures to be taken by Parties to phase down the use of dental
amalgam.9 It should be stressed that the Convention includes
some exemptions for some mercury-added products used for dif-
ferent purposes such as civil protection, military uses, traditional
and religious practices10 that may be used to justify ongoing
mercury imports and a risk of diversion to ASGM.
Informal mercury and informal gold market stakeholders (e.g.,
smugglers, gold shops) may have a direct or indirect inﬂuence on
MT&S for use in ASGM by providing mercury, storing or recycling
mercury in a way that is not easily traceable, or by trading mercury
for gold (see Table A2). They therefore represent an important
barrier to the reduction and elimination of MT&S for use in ASGM.
They facilitate continued use of mercury by miners even when
mercury is prohibited or the ASGM activity is prohibited (Staples
and Rumore, 2015). When MT&S for use in ASGM is informal, the
mercury may only appear in ofﬁcial data (sometimes) at the time
of import into the country, and in any case the end-use will not be
indicated as ASGM. In this case, ﬁeld studies and interviews with
miners and local stakeholders are necessary to understand the
mercury SC and to identify other stakeholders (Experts 1, 2, 3, 4, 7,
8).
According to Saldarriaga-Isaza et al. (2015), there is now a
general consensus that the legalization of ASM by local govern-
ments and the development of ASM speciﬁc regulations are key
actions to support the mercury-free transition and this applies also
to ASGM since it is a sub-sector of ASM. Governments could, for
instance, support the creation of centers to train miners in cleaner
and safer gold processing techniques (García et al., 2015) instead of9 Annex A, Part II of the Minamata Convention (UNEP, 2013a).
10 Annex A, Part I of the Minamata Convention (UNEP, 2013a).relying mostly on temporary training programs organized by
mining associations, NGOs or IGOs. Without active local govern-
ment involvement in the ASGM sector, initiatives to technically,
ﬁnancially or socially support miners have a much higher risk of
failure. Local governments need to invest time and money in for-
malizing miners, in the sustainable management of resources, in
the stabilization of ﬁscal regimes and in the integration of ASGM
into the economic activity of the country – activities that form the
key pillars of “good governmental policy” in ASGM (Hentschel
et al., 2003). Under these conditions, mercury use can be better
controlled, reduced and eventually eliminated.
The World Gold Council (WGC, 2015) has afﬁrmed that the
Large Scale Gold Mining (LSGM) industries, the international
community, civil society and other stakeholders should nudge
governments in this direction. Although mercury use in ASGM is a
global issue, however, the speciﬁcities of each country, region and
even mining site do not permit a common approach to the issue.
As stated by Spiegel (2009a), there is a need to consider the “links
between technological developments, trade relations, trust-
building, environmental health awareness and community gov-
ernance” to adequately understand the sector. A holistic perspec-
tive of ASGM is therefore necessary to understand the stakes of all
stakeholders before intervening in ASGM García et al. (2015), but is
seldom acknowledged in the scientiﬁc literature or implemented
in projects and programs.
Table A2 responds to this need by providing a comprehensive
table of stakeholders and their roles that will help local govern-
ments, mining associations, NGOs and the stakeholders them-
selves to better understand the local context, and to provide
technical and ﬁnancial solutions better adapted to ASGM com-
munities’ needs and the local context. The complete list of stake-
holders shown in Table A2 is not expected to be applicable to all
ASGM contexts, but provides a sound basis in nearly any context
for a more nuanced identiﬁcation of key stakeholders and their
roles, avoiding the need to reinvent the wheel in each case.
4.2. Stakeholders in the mercury supply chain
The sources of mercury for use in ASGM may involve a number
of different stakeholders in the mercury SC. The Minamata Con-
vention on Mercury identiﬁes six different sources of mercury:
primary mercury mining,11 mercury compounds,12 mercury-added
products,13 mercury stocks,14 mercury wastes15 and recovered/
recycled mercury. When in liquid/metallic form, the mercury
emanating from any of these sources may be used in ASGM (Ex-
pert 5). These six sources involve different SCs that are interrelated
as illustrated in Fig. 4. The ellipses identify the stakeholders re-
sponsible for these different mercury sources, the rectangles show
a process (e.g., mercury waste generation) or a status (e.g., mer-
cury storage, disposal or loss), and the diamond shapes representtaining mercury or mercury compounds; or contaminated with mercury or mer-
cury compounds. Mercury wastes shall be handled “in an environmentally sound
manner” as stipulated in the guidelines of the Basel Convention (Art.11, Minamata
Convention).
Fig. 4. Stakeholders in the mercury supply chain (Hg: mercury; LSM: Large-Scale Mining; F: Ferrous: NF: Non-ferrous; MEBA: Mercury Export Ban Act; EU: European Union)
(source: the authors).
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(e.g., mercury exporters and traders). The lower part of the ﬁgure
shows how mercury may end up in ASGM, e.g., through interna-
tional exports and trade of mercury to ASGM countries, and via
local stakeholders as explained in Section 4.1 (Local ASGM
stakeholders).
One of the overarching objectives of the Minamata Convention
is to better control MT&S worldwide, requiring all Parties (fol-
lowing ratiﬁcation) to identify the stocks of mercury and mercury
compounds in their territories; to take measures to ensure that
mercury from chlor-alkali plants is stored/disposed of in an en-
vironmentally sound manner and not reused; and to closely con-
trol the import and export of mercury and mercury-added
products.16 The Minamata Convention also stipulates that mercury
from primary mining and decommissioned chlor-alkali facilities
cannot be used in ASGM.17 Of course, the Convention is legally
binding for Parties only after ratiﬁcation (Expert 9, March 2016).
Primary mercury mining still takes place both in countries like
China, that have signed the Convention, as well as in countries like
Kyrgyzstan, which has not (yet) signed (USGS, 2015). More im-
portantly, East Asia has become an important mercury trading hub
(Zero Mercury Working Group, 2016), while the opening of new
mercury mines in Mexico and Indonesia has been reported. This
may be “a result of shortages of mercury and resulting higher prices
due to the US and EU export bans, in addition to increased demand16 Art. 3, 4, 10 and 11, Minamata Convention (UNEP, 2013a).
17 Article 3 (paragraphs 4 and 5b), Minamata Convention (UNEP, 2013a).for gold” (Expert 9, March 2016). This suggests that stakeholders
from the gold SC may also have a responsibility for the amount of
mercury traded and supplied to ASGM.
The Minamata Convention requires environmentally sound
management of mercury wastes consistent with the Basel Con-
vention on the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes
(Basel Convention, 2016). This means that all countries party to the
Basel Convention that wish to ship mercury wastes to another
country shall inform the respective authorities, which helps to
prevent illegal trade of mercury. Most countries are signatories to
the Basel Convention, although not all signatories have ratiﬁed it,
which means that it has not yet been integrated into national
legislation. This latter group includes several countries with ASGM
activities such as the Philippines, Nigeria and Panama, not to
mention the USA, which does not have ASGM but does have large
amounts of mercury waste (Analysis of the UN Comtrade database
conducted by the ﬁrst author during the participant observation;
Basel Convention, 2016; USGS, 2015). This leaves an opening for
MT&S, in some cases, through waste recycling and industrial
sources that may be diverted to ASGM (Bell et al., 2014), or
through the illegal diversion of mercury wastes. In countries not
party to the Minamata Convention, or subject to the MEBA18 or the
EU export ban,19 recovered mercury may be sold back to the
market or be at risk of disposal that is not environmentally re-
sponsible (Expert 9, March 2016).18 Mercury Export Ban Act (US GPO, 2008).
19 European Union mercury export trade ban (The European Parliament and
the Council of the European Union, 2008).
20 Annex C, Minamata Convention (UNEP, 2013a).
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mercury stocks and reserves is often outdated or not publicly
available (USGS - U.S. Geological Survey, 2015), which makes any
study of MT&S more difﬁcult. This is reﬂected in databases such as
Comtrade, which is a compilation of statistics submitted by UN
member states, where data on mercury imports and exports are
sometimes missing or not consistent (Analysis of the UN Comtrade
database conducted by the ﬁrst author during the participant
observation). Also, some countries producing mercury do not have
good statistics on their production, or do not report it, and many
countries do not have accurate data on mercury stocks, especially
where there is informal mercury trade (Zero Mercury Working
Group, 2016). Hence building a transparent and reasonably com-
prehensive database for worldwide mercury trade is essential and
has been foreseen in the Minamata Convention (Zero Mercury
Working Group, 2016).
Prior to the Minamata Convention, the European Union and the
United States implemented regulations that forbade the export of
mercury (i.e., MEBA, EU mercury export ban), aiming, among other
things, at limiting MT&S for uses like ASGM (USGS - U.S. Geological
Survey, 2015; Wilburn, 2013). Before the implementation of the
MEBA in the USA in 2013, some ﬁrms in the European Union
transferred mercury-containing wastes to the USA to recover ele-
mental mercury for sale outside of the European Union (Wilburn,
2013). This conﬁrms that regulations targeting elemental mercury
leave a loophole for recovered mercury to be diverted to ASGM. In
2005, the global demand for mercury (circa 3000–3900 metric
tones) was primarily for ASGM, vinyl chloride monomer produc-
tion, chlor-alkali production, batteries, dental use, measuring and
control devices, electrical and electronic devices and lighting
(Maxson, 2006). Some of these sectors are known to divert mer-
cury to ASGM (Expert 5), but it is often difﬁcult for ﬁeld re-
searchers to identify the source as the mercury may be sold to
artisanal miners in old beverage bottles (Ban Toxics, 2012, p. 7) or
plastic bags (UNEP, 2005, p.122–123).
Several researchers have promoted mercury regulations as the
solution to control, reduce and/or eliminate mercury use in ASGM.
They contend that a total or partial ban on mercury exports leads
to an increase in the price of mercury and hence more ASGM in-
terest in mercury-free alternatives (Bell et al., 2014; Veiga et al.,
2006b) such as retorts (INC 5, 2013; Spiegel, 2009a; UNEP, 2006b).
This would be accompanied by government support for miners
including education, techniques and ﬁnance (INC 5, 2013). Other
researchers, however, have pointed out that regulations and pol-
icy-making are not sufﬁcient. If ASGM communities do not have
access to mercury, miners could turn to other hazardous sub-
stances such as cyanide, which would also be problematic for the
environment and society (Veiga et al., 2009; Expert 5). Some re-
searchers have even argued that a ban on MT&S might be in-
effective since ASGM would depend even more on informal
sources of mercury (e.g. Spiegel, 2008).
According to Selin and Selin (2006), formulating new regula-
tions should be accomplished through an in-depth consultation
among experts, governments and other stakeholders, and that all
mercury reduction activities should be supervised, progress
should be evaluated and countries should be assisted where they
most need it (Selin and Selin, 2006). Among countries with ASGM
activities, the focus would thus be on domestic capacity building
for responsible mercury management (Selin and Selin, 2006).
Global mercury reduction strategies would have as their main
objective to be “equitable and effective” in addressing the speciﬁc
needs of miners (Spiegel, 2009a; Childs, 2008). As noted by Hinton
(2007), it is critical to understand the interrelated issues of policy,
regulations, environment, human health, culture, society and
economics in ASGM to ensure that measures are effectively im-
plemented and eventually transform the “vicious circle of poverty”and mercury dependency into a “virtuous” one by approaching the
issue of MT&S for use in ASGM with good governance and ap-
propriate policies that integrate measures for environmental pro-
tection, fair distribution of revenues and diversiﬁcation of eco-
nomic activities for ASGM communities (Hinton, 2007).
To adequately address the issue of MT&S in ASGM, it is ne-
cessary to coordinate initiatives at multiple governance levels:
locally, regionally, nationally and internationally (Selin and Selin,
2006; Drace et al., 2012). The engagement between local gov-
ernments and ASGM communities is a precondition to the suc-
cess of local mercury reduction strategies (Spiegel et al., 2014).
One of the critical improvements needed, as compared to past
approaches, is to design mercury policies based on bottom-up
rather than top-down initiatives (Expert 5), which should be
developed in the NAPs for mercury reduction and elimination in
ASGM (Spiegel et al., 2014; UNEP, 2013a 20). Ismawati (2014)
even goes so far as to urge governments to “stop the mercury
use, trade and importation, review and enforce the regulations,
include all stakeholders in the process, introduce alternative li-
velihoods that are more sustainable, and remediate the deva-
stated environment.”
This analysis shows that although some regulations are in
place, it is necessary to address mercury SC stakeholders from a
broader perspective, i.e., primary mercury mining operators,
companies recovering, trading or storing mercury, mercury com-
pounds, mercury-added products and mercury wastes. In addition,
the online survey emphasized the need for:
 developing awareness programs for traders, miners and the
public on the reduction/elimination and the potential health
effects of mercury on ASGM communities;
 pursuing mercury-free technology transfer;
 reinforcing controls of mercury imports at the entry point and
subsequent distribution via custom ofﬁcers, trade ministry, se-
curity agents, lawyers, etc.;
 implementing mercury tracking systems (see Table S2) and
enforcement of regulations speciﬁc to ASGM via, for instance,
registration of mercury traders, distributors and users; and
 developing harmonized mercury regulations on trade, use, im-
ports and storage worldwide (see Table S3).
4.3. The operating environment
Beyond the local stakeholders and the mercury SC stake-
holders, the issue of MT&S for use in ASGM needs to consider the
stakeholders active in the operating environment, as described by
Freeman et al. (2010) (Fig. 5).
Most governments look to international collaboration as an
effective way to reduce MT&S. Nevertheless, it is politically difﬁ-
cult to coordinate local, regional, national, and global initiatives
(Selin and Selin, 2006), especially in light of different local, re-
gional, etc. circumstances. In this context, NGOs and IGOs are ac-
tive in promoting alternatives to mercury, clean techniques, ca-
pacity building and awareness raising (e.g., UNEP, UNIDO, ILO,
World Bank, ARM). They provide training, guidance and technical
and ﬁnancial assistance. Due to the variety of organizations
working in ASGM and mercury, special coordination is necessary
in order to avoid duplication of effort (Metcalf, 2008; Staples and
Rumore, 2015; INC 5, 2013). This may even be true within a single
government when different ministries oversee activities related to
ASGM (e.g., Ministries of Environment, Health, Mines). Ad-
ditionally, the activities of IGOs and NGOs are often restricted by
the donors ﬁnancing these activities, whether governments, the
Fig. 5. Mercury trade and supply stakeholders from the ASGM operating environment (Hg: mercury; P: policies; T: training; D: donations; FS: ﬁnancial support; F: for-
malization; B: boycott; AR: awareness raising) (source: the authors).
Fig. 6. Stakeholders in the operating environment of mercury trade and supply for use in ASGM and interrelated supply chains (SC: supply chain; Hg: mercury; P: policies; T:
training; D: donations; FS: ﬁnancial support; F: formalization; B: boycott; AR: awareness raising) (source: the authors).
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typically specify the kind of activity to be conducted, with whom,
how and how long (UNIDO, 2015), the type of technology to be
transferred/tested (Expert 5), and often want to reach the largest
possible audience as a measure of the success of their activities
(Metcalf, 2008; Dennison, 2013), but the quality and sustainability
of the approach must not be neglected.
As an example, a project in Tanzania that focused on transfer-
ring to ASGM communities the mercury-free technology of using
retorts was subsequently judged to be a failure (Jønsson et al.,
2013). It may be argued that the project would have been more
effective if the donors had insisted on ﬁrst understanding how theminers worked, what their needs were and how they could be
convinced that retorts were necessary. Mining communities, and
women in particular, could play a signiﬁcant role if the message
focuses on the health of children, for instance, thereby obliging
miners in the family to be more cautious with mercury use. This
implies a need for more preliminary empirical research on-site to
demonstrate the impact of mercury on the community and inform
them about it. Stakeholders including government, local re-
searchers, students, NGOs, etc., who can approach the relevant
communities with “empathy” should be engaged in such longer-
term projects or, in the case of government, on a permanent basis
(personal communication, J. Jønsson, May 2016).
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term effects of international and national policies in other sectors
such as agriculture, gold mining or diamond mining. For instance,
in the mid-1990s the decrease in cotton prices and the increase in
subsidies by governments to European and American farmers
contributed to the bankruptcy of many Malian cotton farmers
(Hilson, 2012). ASGM was one of the limited economic alternatives
for farmers and their families.
Some researchers have shown that a shift between mining
activities is also possible. As pointed out by Nyame and Grant
(2012) in the case of Ghana, the temporary diamond export ban in
Ghana and the Kimberley Process Certiﬁcation Scheme led to a
reduced proﬁt for diamond miners and some of them decided to
shift to gold mining. In Angola a similar trend has been observed
and as a consequence, both ASGM and large-scale gold mining
activities are expected to increase (Nyame and Grant, 2012). This
might towel be damaging to the environment (Nyame and Grant,
2012) if mercury amalgamation is the main ASGM technique used
to extract gold.
Gold policies also appear to inﬂuence the number of ASGM
miners and MT&S (Expert 8; Davis, 2014). In Zimbabwe, for ex-
ample, the increased proﬁtability of gold mining resulting from the
United States’ decision to drop the gold standard in the 1970s, and
concurrent Zimbabwean subsidies to increase mineral exports, led
to an increase in the number of gold mining operations (Metcalf,
2008). Since ASGM miners in Zimbabwe commonly use mercury
(Metcalf, 2008), this certainly included an increase in ASGM and
the use of mercury. This underscores the observation that even
beyond national policy-making, governments have an interest in
effectively cooperating and exchanging information that may af-
fect mercury polices and strategies for ASGM. Cooperation should
also extend to global corporations and networks that tend to im-
pose their own standards and rules in cases where the governance
system is weak (Elbra, 2014).
The lack of accessibility to many ASGM sites is another factor
that inﬂuences mercury SCs (Expert 8; Expert 9, March 2016).
Many ASGM activities are located in remote areas where little or
no support is available (Bell et al., 2014; INC 5, 2013). Market
mechanisms operate in such a way that mercury tends to be more
expensive and gold prices are lower in remote areas due to the
transport distances and sometimes additional intermediaries.
These challenges may be enough in some areas to encourage
ASGM use of alternative technologies (INC 5, 2013). Nevertheless,
the effective support, engagement and communication between
mercury importing and exporting governments is needed to
monitor MT&S developments covering these areas (INC 5, 2013).
The research community is expected to contribute to a better
understanding of MT&S, especially in “commerce and trade in
mercury and mercury compounds and mercury-added products.”21
The Minamata Convention deﬁnes some research areas, mainly
linked to technical and economic research (e.g., analyzing the
technical and economic viability of mercury-free products and
processes and best available technology (BAT), mercury inventory
methods, monitoring levels of mercury use, harmonizing meth-
odologies). But as underlined by researchers like Spiegel (2009a)
and Metcalf (2008), researchers and policy-makers also need to
take some distance from the technology focused approaches and
expand their research to better understand the socioeconomic
factors that drive the behavior and poor environmental practices
of miners. Hence research should also contribute to a holistic
understanding of mercury trade, supply and use, and the identi-
ﬁcation of local stakeholders in order to come to a better appre-
ciation of mercury related systems, stakeholders, and21 Art. 19, Minamata Convention (UNEP, 2013a).stakeholders’ roles and interactions. Students and researchers may
be more effective in collecting site-speciﬁc information and
building relationships with miners due to their neutral role in the
ASGM context.
The Minamata Convention emphasizes the importance of a
broad range of stakeholders contributing ﬁnancially to reduce and
eventually eliminate MT&S for use in ASGM.22 Interestingly, a
number of stakeholders rarely addressed in the literature, such as
the private sector or consumer associations, may have a role to
play. For example, private sector stakeholders from the gold SC
such as gold reﬁners, jewelry and electronics manufacturers are
implicated since their business activities add to the gold demand
which inﬂuences the activities of LSGM and ASGM. It may be an-
ticipated that many would be willing to dedicate a small percen-
tage of their revenues to mercury-free ASGM initiatives, which
could comprise an important contribution (Expert 5). But ﬁrst they
need to be better informed of the mercury problem and their roles
and responsibilities as stakeholders, which is the job of govern-
ments, educational systems, researchers, associations, NGOs, IGOs
and the media.
According to experts in the ﬁeld of ASGM, SC management, in
particular for certiﬁcation, is currently a “hot” topic (Expert 5;
Expert 2) along with other urgent ASGM issues such as legalization
and formalization, conﬂict minerals, contribution to local devel-
opment and appropriate technologies (Expert 5). Hence guidelines
and regulations under development tend to approach the issue
from a SC perspective to ensure the supply of gold from “legit-
imate” activities is in line with the Conﬂict-Free Gold Standard
(WGC, 2012) or the Dodd Frank Act. The Swiss Agency for Devel-
opment and Cooperation has stated that stakeholders like gov-
ernments, industry, civil society, ASGM, consumers and develop-
ment agencies need to be engaged in formalization processes
(Hruschka, 2011).
Likewise, the general public has considerable power to push
companies and global supply chains to act more responsibly
(Rotter et al., 2013). Consumers may push companies to imple-
ment due diligence in their supply chains, which would require
them to engage with stakeholders and mobilize resources like
technology, information and services in the activities taking place
between gold mining and the end consumer (OECD, 2012).
There is a risk that imposing a mercury-free standard for gold
production and gold sourcing may exclude many ASGM miners
from the gold market (WGC, 2015; Expert 5), which poses an
ethical problem since many have limited economic alternatives.
One could imagine the emergence of an “ASGM-free” SC for gold
which, for many companies, would comprise the easiest way to
comply with a mercury-free standard like it is the case for other
chemicals (Expert 5; UNEP, 2014). As a result, awareness raising
among the general public needs to be conducted with care in or-
der to avoid a situation similar to the conﬂict-free mineral in-
itiative, where ASGM gold may simply be refused in favor of
mercury-free or fair-trade gold. This is already the case with some
reﬁners (Expert 5), although at present such “certiﬁed” gold re-
presents only a small share of gold from ASGM (Expert 5). As
observed by Eshun (2005) in the case of Ghana, when the ASGM
status quo is disrupted, it is important to provide alternative
economic opportunities in parallel with the engagement of all
stakeholders, formalization of the sector, training, land manage-
ment, understanding of informal practices, fund raising, technol-
ogy and education. This reiterates the need to engage multiple
stakeholders at multiple levels and understand their stakes in
MT&S for ASGM.22 Art. 13, Minamata Convention (UNEP, 2013a).
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Research in ASGM often emphasizes the need to raise aware-
ness of miners, formalize their activities and rely on technology
transfer to reduce mercury use. When taking a SC perspective to
identify multi-level stakeholders and their roles, it becomes evi-
dent that these miner-focused initiatives are insufﬁcient due to a
lack of holistic understanding of the interactions between multi-
level stakeholders. As shown in Table A2 and Section 4.1 (Local
ASGM stakeholders), multiple local stakeholders may play direct
or indirect roles in MT&S for use in ASGM. The wider the scope
(regional, national, international), the more stakeholders are
involved.
Although the relevant stakeholders and their roles cannot be
generalized (due to the speciﬁcities of each local situation, but also
due to the limited number of experts consulted for this research),
the ﬁndings of this research provide a better understanding of
MT&S for use in ASGM, which facilitates the provision of aware-
ness raising activities to the various stakeholders. Awareness
raising for governments and law enforcement agencies is parti-
cularly important in countries where mercury use in ASGM is
strictly forbidden, since the formalization of miners is a key factor
in reducing MT&S for use in ASGM. Awareness raising among
LSGM companies may also be valuable to demonstrate how they
can enhance their image with the ASGM community, how they can
support the mercury-free transition of ASGM, or how their re-
putation may be at risk (see Table A2), any of which should en-
courage them to commit to the mercury-free transition of ASGM
activities (e.g., via consultation, suggestions to manage and mini-
mize risks) (ICMM, 2009). As an idea for possible further study, an
LSGM company could even oversee demonstration of mercury-free
(and cyanide-free) ASGM activities on a part of its property, with
technologies adapted to the local geology and needs of ASGM
miners, to increase capacity building among miners.Since mercury
traceability, customs systems and harmonization have been iden-
tiﬁed as key success factors to reduce and control MT&S for use in
ASGM ( Table S2), the development and cost of such measures
should be shared among local and international governments as
well as a range of mercury SC stakeholders (see Fig. 4), all of whom
would beneﬁt from improved transparency of the mercury SC
(UNEP, 2014) and better control of MT&S for ASGM.
Awareness raising of miners with regard to health and en-
vironment effects of mercury use is essential, but needs to be
complemented by other activities (e.g., public information, edu-
cation on alternatives, development of training and collaboration
activities between IGOs, NGOs and local populations), as stated in
the Minamata Convention.23 To support this, donors’ project
scopes, timeframes, objectives and resources may all need to be
revised, as a number of shorter-term projects have proven to be
ineffective (e.g., Jønsson et al., 2009). An enhanced understanding
of the local context, the stakeholders and their needs by way of
bottom-up analysis would lead to an expanded list of critical ac-
tivities including investigating the role of women in ASGM com-
munities and their direct or indirect inﬂuence on MT&S; the role of
culture and beliefs in ASGM communities (UNEP, 2008a, Module
5); supporting the different government bodies in building ade-
quate policies and coordinating actions (e.g., Ministries of Mine,
Environment, Trade, Finance); encouraging local researchers and
students with more intimate connections to ASGM communities
to collect the necessary information to quantify mercury use and
impacts, and develop NAPs; and engaging with gold SC stake-
holders (e.g., reﬁners, jewelers, electronics industry) to discuss the
advantages for them to ﬁnance new activities. Stakeholders that23 Art. 18, Minamata Convention (UNEP, 2013a).are not part of the mercury or gold supply chains may also have an
interest in being more closely involved due to corporate image
issues (e.g., companies producing or selling beverages locally,
whose bottles are being used to store mercury).
The decision of some countries to ban MT&S for use in ASGM
poses ethical problems if miners are not aware of mercury-free
alternatives, as they typically cannot get technical or ﬁnancial
support, and alternative economic activities, even when available,
are often not adequate to earn a living. Programs to control and
reduce mercury trade and use should hence be complemented by
socio-economic activities designed to develop viable economic
alternatives adapted to the local context, like the creation of a local
market to produce mercury-free technologies with materials
available locally (Expert 5). This could be related to research re-
garding a sustainable business model, for instance.
In addition to mercury SC stakeholders, other researchers have
implicitly shown the need for a closer study of other stakeholders
and supply chains such as in the gold sector (Ali, 2006), technology
sector (e.g., pilot plant projects for which the scope is deﬁned by
donors, Expert 5), and food sector (Telmer and Veiga, 2009; Expert
5), although any additional SC of course adds complexity (see
Fig. 6).
The identiﬁcation of stakeholders and their roles has focused
on MT&S for use in ASGM, although stakeholder roles are apt to
change over time (Savage et al., 2004). When considering the issue
globally or with a different perspective (e.g., industrial mercury
emissions), additional or different stakeholders and roles may be
identiﬁed. Also, making the link with stakeholder analysis tech-
niques, it may be observed that the number of roles identiﬁed for
each stakeholder could be a way to identify legitimate or priority
stakeholders, which may also help governments to set priorities in
their NAPs. If so, local governments, informal mercury and gold
stakeholders, certiﬁcation bodies and ASGM associations would be
among the most relevant local stakeholders to engage for mer-
cury-free transition (in addition to ASGM miners), each having
more than three different key roles (see Fig. 3). In the operating
environment, the priority stakeholders would be Governments,
IGOs, NGOs and international ﬁnanciers or capital investors (see
Fig. 6).
As mentioned in the introduction, the results of this research
may also be linked to the UN Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs), which depict a sustainable world in terms of social and
environmental challenges. Policies to improve the sustainability of
ASGM clearly contribute to the SDGs. For instance, the right of the
ownership of land (target 1.4) is a critical issue for ASGM. The use
of mercury-free techniques would also contribute to several SDGs,
especially goal 3 (ensure healthy lives and promote wellbeing for
all at all ages), goal 6 (ensure availability and sustainable man-
agement of water and sanitation for all) and less directly, goal 14
(conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine re-
sources for sustainable development). At the same time, advances
in some of the SDGs will improve the situation of workers and
local communities in ASGM: goal 8 (promote sustained, inclusive
and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employ-
ment and decent work for all) and goal 9 (build resilient infra-
structure, promote sustainable industrialization and foster in-
novation) could be supported via certiﬁcation schemes for gold
based on environmental and social criteria, promoting alternative
sources of income like tourism, access to ﬁnancial services or the
support of local production of machines and equipment like re-
torts. To reach such targets, this paper emphasizes the need to
strengthen the means to implement a mercury-free transition by
engaging multiple stakeholders at multiple levels, and revitalizing
or creating partnerships for sustainable development (goal 17).
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This paper identiﬁes and discusses local, regional, national and
international stakeholders that are affected by, or may directly or
indirectly affect MT&S for use in ASGM. By considering the mer-
cury SC and the operating environment, this paper identiﬁes sta-
keholders that are not systematically addressed in other ASGM
literature. The paper provides a holistic picture of these multi-level
stakeholders, and formulates recommendations for IGOs, NGOs
and local governments that help to shift ASGM activities towards a
mercury-free future. The identiﬁcation of multi-level stakeholders
and their roles also enables national and local governments with
ASGM activities to understand certain supply chain mechanisms
that may directly or indirectly affect MT&S for use in ASGM. This is
particularly relevant for the development of NAPs. By taking a
supply chain perspective, the authors are able to identify stake-
holders in an objective manner that highlights their shared re-
sponsibility for mercury use in ASGM, and reafﬁrms the fact that
miners are not the only group that should be expected to address
the mercury problem. And equally important, the authors con-Table A1
Proﬁle of mercury and ASGM experts who participated in the research.
Expert number Expert identity Organization/type of organization
Expert 1 Conﬁdential Government (Environmental Protect
Expert 2 Ludovic Bernaudat Lead - Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold
at the time the questionnaire was re
Expert 3 Dr. Benjamin Mapani Associate of the Artisanal Gold Counc
of Namibia
Expert 4 Professor Marcello M. Veiga,
P.Eng., Ph.D.
Professor and researcher, University
Expert 5 Dipl.-Ing. Dr.mont. Felix
Hruschka
Formerly assistant professor in the D
Economics of Leoben University. Cur
Expert 6 Patrick Schein Chief Executive Ofﬁcer of S&P Tradin
Expert 7 Conﬁdential Inter-governmental organization
Expert 8 Yuyun Ismawati Environmental Health Specialist on m
Advisor of BaliFokus Foundation (NG
Network
Expert 9 Kenneth Davis Program Ofﬁcer, UNEP Chemicals Bra
nership and supporting UNEP’s role
Convention on Mercury
Table A2
Local stakeholders and their roles and inﬂuence regarding mercury trade and supply fo
Inﬂuence Stakeholders Role(s)
Direct Legal mercury market sellers Mercury provider
to miners (Expert
Expert 4, 2015).
Gold shops Mercury recovery
erators and comm
In some locations,
gold amalgam is p
Direct and indirect ASGM miners Direct inﬂuence:
tively cheap techn
natives, or they ca
2009b; Metcalf, 20
2009b). Some min
2008).
Depending on the
of mercury used c
miners recover m
95% of the mercur
ASGM miners from
2015). Veiga et al.
effective method t
approach”.clude that without the active engagement of other key stake-
holders, the problem of mercury in ASGM will not and cannot be
adequately addressed. This realization is absolutely fundamental
in a context where further awareness needs to be raised among a
wider range of stakeholders, not least the private sector and the
general public.Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank all the stakeholders that ac-
tively participated in this research, especially the UNEP, DTIE,
Chemicals branch, Geneva and the experts.Appendices
(See Tables A1 and A2).First
round
Second round
ion Agency) x
Mining, UNEP Global Mercury Partnership (UNIDO
ceived)
x x
il. Researcher and Senior Lecturer at the University x
of British Columbia x
epartment for Mining Engineering and Mineral
rently consultant at tbb.hru
x x
g (company trading and reﬁning gold from ASGM) x
x x
ercury and ASGM/Mining, co-founder and Senior
O) and co-founder of the Indonesia Toxics-Free
x x
nch (IGO), coordinating the Global Mercury Part-
in assisting countries to implement the Minamata
x x
r use in ASGM.
. When mercury use in ASGM is allowed, authorized mercury sellers sell mercury
5; Expert 4, 2015). The stakeholders involved are very site-speciﬁc (Expert 5;
, mercury provider. Gold shops reﬁne the amalgam received from ASGM op-
only trade mercury informally (Spiegel and Veiga, 2010; Expert 5; Expert 4, 2015).
the owners of gold shops sell the recovered mercury to miners after the mercury-
rocessed using retorts or fume hoods (Expert 9, 2015).
mercury use, mercury recovery. Most miners use mercury because it is a rela-
ique to capture the gold from their ore and because they are unaware of alter-
nnot afford alternatives they are aware of (Telmer and Veiga, 2009; Spiegel,
08). Miners are often unaware of mercury dangers (Jønsson et al., 2009; Spiegel,
ers think that the more mercury is used, the more gold is recovered (Metcalf,
type of technology used and the processing phase when mercury is used, the ratio
ompared to gold produced may greatly vary (UNEP, 2006b; Spiegel, 2009a). Some
ercury with retorts which enables mercury emissions to be contained and up to
y to be reused (Spiegel, 2009a). When ASGM leaders adopt better practices, other
their social network may be encouraged to do the same (Saldarriaga-Isaza et al.,
(2006b) show for instance that by examining past projects in ASGM, “the most
o convince miners to change their techniques has been via a social or cultural
Table A2 (continued )
Inﬂuence Stakeholders Role(s)
Indirect. In countries where no legal frameworks for ASGM exist, miners are prisoners of the “vi-
cious circle of informality” (Hentschel et al., 2003, p.9). This means that formalization, training and
awareness raising of miners are not possible due to the illegal status of the activity (Hilson, 2008;
Verbrugge and Buxton, 2014). The formalization of the activity is essential to enable miners and
their community to operate formally and as such allow the development of strategies to control
mercury trade and use. Since the opportunity for ASGM miners to formally obtain a concession is
limited, they work on abandoned mining sites, LSGM sites, etc. (Teschner, 2013; Spiegel, 2009a;
ICMM - International Council on Mining & Metals, 2009). As they always bear the risk of being
removed from their site by military forces for instance (Dondeyne et al., 2009; Hilson, 2008), they do
not invest in cleaner techniques. In some cases, miners are “not interested to formalize because they
do not want to pay for it” (UNEP, 2011). The rising price of mercury has to some extent made miners
more cautious about the quantity of mercury they use (García et al., 2015).
ASGM communities Directly impacted. Local air and food chain are highly contaminated by mercury emissions and
releases that end up in ﬁsh (Hinton et al., 2003; Velásquez-López et al. 2010; Wong et al., 2006), rice
(Hinton, 2007), and other crops (Babut et al., 2003). As stated by Telmer and Veiga (2009), “Global
food chain contamination is likely to be occurring through long range atmospheric transport, de-
position, and accumulation in global ﬁsheries - global ecosystem damage is likely to be occurring.”
Indirect inﬂuence. Culture, beliefs and habits of ASGM communities (UNEP, 2008a, Module 5;
UNEP, 2005) may constitute a strong barrier to the adoption of alternatives to mercury (Metcalf,
2008).
Informal mercury and informal gold market
stakeholders
Direct inﬂuence as mercury provider, mercury storage, mercury recycling. Provide ASGM miners
with mercury diverted from different sources like local industries using mercury-added products
(i.e., in some locations, dentists or chlor-alkali plants) (UNEP 2013c; Sousa and Veiga, 2009; Expert
5). May have different roles and are named differently in literature (Spiegel, 2009a). “Middlemen”
buy gold from miners, smuggle mercury and may be involved in money laundering or criminal
activities (Hilson and Ackah-Baidoo, 2011; Hruschka, 2011; Spiegel, 2009a). “Brokers” help in mer-
cury trade and unknown or undeclared mercury storage and mercury recycling activities (Diaz,
2011; Ismawati, 2014). “Smugglers” or “illegal dealers” also buy gold (Hinton, 2007; Spiegel and
Veiga, 2010), promote the use of mercury and bargain the price of gold in exchange for a reduced
price or “free” supply of mercury (Dondeyne et al., 2009).
Indirect. These roles affect the gold revenues of the local governments, which is an incentive for
governments to ﬁght against gold smuggling (Dondeyne et al., 2009; Kambani, 1995) and (in-
directly) informal mercury supply.
Local government, law enforcement agencies,
ofﬁcial gold buyers
Direct inﬂuence via policy-making, ﬁnancial support, formalization, awareness raising. Decide
upon the local status of ASGM and the authorization or prohibition of mercury use in ASGM. If they
are Parties to the Minamata Convention, they must build National Action Plans (NAPs) that include
“strategies for managing trade and preventing the diversion of mercury and mercury compounds
from both foreign and domestic sources to use in artisanal and small scale gold mining and pro-
cessing” (UNEP, 2015).a Simpliﬁcation of licensing procedures, decentralized support and effective
and regular communication between local governments and miners are also keys for success of
mercury policies in ASGM (Veiga et al., 2006b). Although formalizing is one of the basic steps, it is in
most cases not sufﬁcient and requires in addition enforcement policies and controls (Hilson, 2008).
Indirect via policy-making (on gold). Sometimes focus only on revenues from gold extraction and
do not believe that mercury is a threat to human health and the environment (Metcalf, 2008). Such
governments would hence not support policies and programs for mercury-free transition (Hilson,
2008). But often the revenues from gold are highly important for local governments, and informal
mining is an issue since it deprives them of the revenue generated by the payment of taxes
(Hentschel et al., 2003, p.9). Communicating on gold revenues may be the best way to get local
government support for formalization, and indirectly control and reduce mercury trade and supply.
Local governments decide upon the local sales price of gold which has an impact on the bargaining
power of informal mercury and informal gold market stakeholders and the MT&S for use in ASGM
(Kambani, 1995; Dondeyne et al., 2009). When the price of gold is ﬁxed too far below the global gold
market price, the number of smugglers tends to rise (Metcalf, 2008) and hence the informal mercury
supply to ASGM miners too.
Indirect via land management. Leasing lands to LSGM is often preferred to putting effort into
formalization of ASGM miners (Hirons, 2011). But without formalization the trade and supply of
mercury for use in ASGM cannot be controlled.
Indirect Technology owners/Processing site owners Mercury provider, mercury recycling. They may be informal mercury and informal gold market
stakeholders (Siegel and Veiga, 2009) and hence have a direct role as described above. Technology
owners (e.g., mill owners) need to trust alternative technologies to promote them and hence useful
to train them and raise their awareness (Spiegel, 2009b; Veiga et al. 2006a). “Millers would be
responsible for sound mercury management on their premises and for ensuring compliance with
regulations” (Spiegel, 2009b).
ASGM miners’ associations or cooperative Lobby, awareness raising, training, formalization. Lobby for miners on security, training, or ﬁ-
nancing issues (UNECA, 2002). Intermediates between NGOs/IGOs and ASGM miners for awareness
raising, training activities and formalization (Hilson and Ackah-Baidoo, 2011; Sousa et al., 2011;
Metcalf, 2008). Rather than relying only on ASGM miners’ associations/cooperatives that often re-
present ASGM miners (Hilson, 2008), awareness raising actions also need to be targeted at the
ASGM miners directly to enable “transparent consultation” and emphasize what the needs of miners
are to “ensure fair and efﬁcient project administration” (Metcalf, 2008). The effectiveness of these
intermediates is limited due to planning and management difﬁculties; a lack of trust (from miners)
in their leaders – especially when the association is strongly supported by the local Government;
insufﬁcient technical facilities; and limited ﬁnancial resources (Hilson, 2008; Fisher, 2007; UNECA,
2002).
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Table A2 (continued )
Inﬂuence Stakeholders Role(s)
LSGM Awareness raising. Hilson (2007) depicts large-scale gold mining companies as “cash-cow seekers”
with a huge bargaining power against the local government and communities. LSM have to in-
creasingly consider ASM as a stakeholder since both sectors are expanding (ICMM - International
Council on Mining & Metals, 2009). A greater involvement of LSGM could help raise awareness
among ASGM miners and the local population, or by providing ASGM miners with mining sites
owned by the LSGM but not being operated (Hilson, 2007). According to Boatri et al. (2015), CSR
activities in the mining sector may help ASGM miners become more aware of the environmental,
social and economic impacts of their activities. LSGM is however not always exemplary or en-
vironmentally friendly regarding tailings disposal, for instance (Spiegel & Veiga, 2010). This lack of
commitment to sustainability discredits the initiatives aiming to reduce ASGM impacts on the
environment.
Land management. There is a need for a consensus between LSGM companies and ASGM with
regard to land management, due to its scarcity and inefﬁcient use (Hilson, 2007). Several experts in
ASGM consider that LSGM and ASGM are complementary (Expert 5; WGC - World Gold Council,
2015). ASGM miners could play a role in the pre- and post-mining phases of LSGM (e.g. exploration
work; processing of non-proﬁtable areas for LSGM) (ICCM, 2009).
The role of LSGM may vary depending on the local context but LSGM may ease the dialogue and
engagement of ASGMminers so that ASGMminers are for instance supported in the development of
viable activities (WGC - World Gold Council, 2015). As for many voluntary initiatives, LSGM may
only support ASGM towards a mercury-free transition if the local governments allow it (WGC -
World Gold Council, 2015), which implies that the activity must be authorized and miners must be
formalized (Hilson, 2008).
Landowners and concession holders Land management. In some countries, lands may also be informally traded between local land-
owners, miners and other groups (Nyame and Blocher, 2010). If the use of mining sites by ASGM
miners were better organized and formalized, the techniques used could be controlled and hence
the negative impact on the environment could be reduced (Dondeyne et al., 2009).
Financiers/capital investors Financial support. May include a variety of people like “former miners, local merchants and agri-
cultural elites, army and rebel commanders, and engineers (often previously employed in large-scale
mining)” (Verbrugge and Buxton, 2014). They often do not collaborate with ASGM miners because
they are not formalized and/or because the activity is informal in the country. If the legal context
allows, ﬁnanciers or capital investors may support ASGM miners by lending them the money they
need to get formalized and invest in cleaner technologies (Spiegel, 2009a). However, the types of
operating licenses that ASGM miners usually get are often short-term and not renewable, which is
unattractive for ﬁnanciers (UNECA, 2002, p. 23).
Certiﬁcation bodies Certiﬁcation, training. The Fairtrade and Fairmined Gold Standards from Fairtrade Labelling Or-
ganizations International (FLO) and the Alliance for Responsible Mining (ARM) require that miners
abandon progressively the use of chemicals, in particular mercury, while processing their ore (ARM –
Alliance for Responsible Mining, 2014). The certiﬁcation organization provides training to support
miners towards this goal. Buying gold from gold miners at a fair price may signiﬁcantly contribute to
reduced use of mercury (García et al., 2015). But to be certiﬁed, miners must be legalized and for-
malized, and since ASGM gold contributes to host governments’ revenues, these are not likely to
support the transition towards a direct gold sales system between ASGM miners and gold buyers
(Hilson, 2008).
Protectors, security guards The role of “Protectors, security guards”, may be limited to the surveillance of gold production and
transportation from ASGM sites to gold shops but “with transport of a high-value good like mercury,
which may even be illegal, it’s very likely that there will be security personnel involved” (Expert 8, 2015;
Expert 9, March 2016).
a UNEP (2015) and Annex C, Minamata Convention (UNEP, 2013a).
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